Reconsidering a transplant: A response to Wagner by Beck, Simon
1 
 
Note: This is an un-formatted version of the article that appears in South African Journal of 
Philosophy, 35(2), 2016, 132-140. 
 
Reconsidering a transplant: A response to Wagner 
Simon Beck 
Philosophy Department, University of the Western Cape, Bellville 
South Africa 
 
Author email: sbeck@uwc.ac.za 
 
Nils-Frederic Wagner takes issue with my argument that influential critics of “transplant” 
thought experiments make two cardinal mistakes. He responds that the mistakes I 
identify are not mistakes at all. The mistakes are rather on my part, in that I have not 
taken into account the conceptual genesis of personhood, that my view of thought 
experiments is idiosyncratic and possibly self-defeating, and in that I have ignored 
important empirical evidence about the relationship between brains and minds. I argue 
that my case still stands and that transplant thought experiments can do damage to 
rivals of a psychological continuity theory of personal identity like Marya Schechtman’s 
Person Life View. 
 
Some background 
Nils-Frederic Wagner (2016) takes issue with my argument (Beck 2014) that influential critics 
of ‘transplant’ thought experiments make two cardinal mistakes. He responds that the 
mistakes I identify are not mistakes at all. The mistakes are rather on my part, in that I have 
not taken into account the conceptual genesis of personhood, that my view of thought 
experiments is idiosyncratic and possibly self-defeating, and in that I have ignored important 
empirical evidence about the relationship between brains and minds. Once all of these are 
taken into account, the case that I have suggested in support of these thought experiments 
and a psychological continuity theory (PCT) of personal identity disappears, and what 
emerges is a case for its rivals—especially the one I highlighted for criticism, Marya 
Schechtman’s Person Life View. 
Transplant thought experiments are those in which the cerebrum of one individual is 
envisaged as being successfully transplanted into the “decerebrated” body of another. They 
have often been taken as central to the case for showing the PCT to be correct, in that we 
respond that we would go along with our cerebrum and psychology into a new body. This 
intuitive response is consistent with how that theory explains identity—as a matter of 
overlapping psychological connections forming the continuity that marks personal 
persistence. My focus on such thought experiments was not because I see them as crucial 
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to supporting the theory of personal identity that I think comes closest to getting things right. 
Rather, it was because they seemed to be most suited to meeting the demands of critics of 
thought experiments (and that theory) in the personal identity debate. In fact, the ones on 
which I focused were ones proposed by those critics themselves. When everything else is 
said, these are ones they are prepared to consider. I am persuaded that Locke’s old story of 
the prince and the cobbler reveals important things about the concept of personal identity,1 
but others have told me that they could not grasp what Locke was asking them to imagine. 
So I focused on thought experiments that appeared much easier to imagine. Since they were 
the products of the critics’ imagination, I hoped to put that complaint aside. 
They were of even more interest as it seemed to me that, once some methodological 
points were understood, they could do damage to the theories favoured by some of those 
critics. 
 
The “Two Mistakes” 
The mistakes I identified were in the thought of Kathleen Wilkes, Bernard Williams and 
(more recently) Marya Schechtman. Wilkes focuses on fission thought experiments rather 
than transplant-type ones, but her arguments can be easily applied to the latter as well. She 
objects that they require us to make predictions that we are in no position to make. The 
thought experiments posit worlds utterly unlike our own and then require us to predict how 
our concepts would operate (“what we would say”) if we existed under those conditions. To 
do that, though, we would need to know all sorts of things that we cannot possibly know: 
It is obviously and essentially relevant to the purposes of this thought experiment to 
know such things as: how often? Is it predictable? Or sometimes predictable and 
sometimes not, like dying? Can it be prevented? Just as obviously, the background 
society, against which we set the phenomenon is now mysterious. Does it have such 
institutions as marriage? How could that work? Or universities? It would be difficult, 
to say the least, if universities doubled in size every few days, or weeks, or years. 
Are pregnant women debarred from splitting? The entire background here is 
incomprehensible (Wilkes 1988, 11). 
 
That sounds at first like a reasonable response, but it seemed to me to include some 
strange thinking. The point of thought experiments that ask what we would say is to find out 
what we ultimately believe about something—the implicit conditions underlying our 
application of a concept. That is, they attempt to test our deep commitments—which roughly 
correspond to the necessary conditions for our application of a concept. Many conditions will 
be met in such an application, but we are more committed to some than to others; we find 
                                           
1
 As a result, I am not at all sure that I am committed to the ‘brain cause’ view of psychological 
continuity that Wagner says I insist upon (20). At the same time, I am very much a materialist and 
dispute only a few of the things he has to say about the relationship between brain, body and 
distinctive psychology. 
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out which by separating usually co-instantiated conditions. That is what counterfactual 
scenarios are meant to achieve: we are faced with a scenario in which some usual condition 
no longer obtains and asked to consider whether our concept still applies. 
But if that is so, we are not being asked for a prediction about what concept people 
would have if conditions were to change. That is, we are not being asked what we would say 
if we were to exist under those conditions—how our concept would change if things changed 
radically. We are being asked whether we are able to apply our concept as we understand it 
now to a situation where a particular condition no longer obtains. This is not something 
impossible to predict, unlike the answer to Wilkes’s question. We either respond readily, or 
we do not, just as when we read science fiction. I called Wilkes’s emphasis on what we 
would say in the situation (rather than what we say about it) the error of mistaking us for 
them. 
The second error I referred to as that of mistaking thought experiments as confirmers. 
Williams (1970, 179–180) rejects body-swap thought experiments like Locke’s2 on the 
grounds that there are other possible outcomes similar to that envisaged which create 
difficulties for a psychological continuity theory of identity, and which the thought 
experimenter suppresses. I argued that this strategy only has any teeth if thought 
experiments are understood as (somehow conclusively) showing a theory to be true. If there 
are thought experiments that create difficulties for the PCT, then a body-swap thought 
experiment with which it is consistent does not show it to be correct. But the point of the 
body-swap case to which Williams objects is to show that having the same body is not a 
necessary condition for being the same person. This consequence still stands even if there 
are other arguments against the PCT and so Williams’s case misses the mark. And I 
suggested that the idea that thought experiments could show a theory to be true is simply 
implausible: telling a story that is consistent with a theory only illustrates it—it provides no 
more confirmation for that theory than for any other theory consistent with the story. Where 
thought experiments have their teeth is in showing theories to be false—as being 
inconsistent with our conceptual scheme. The damage caused by Williams’s body-swap 
thought experiment to his own theory that bodily continuity is necessary for identity stands. 
I suggested that Wilkes’ and others’ insistence that thought experimental scenarios are 
usually hopelessly under-specified rests on a similar mistake. As we have seen, she thinks 
that once the detail required for us to respond adequately to them is supplied, they become 
incomprehensible. The detail is needed to “establish the phenomenon” to which they appeal. 
But establishing the phenomenon in detail is only required if the experiment is to provide 
evidence for a theory (otherwise detail is only required, for heuristic purposes, to assist those 
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 He does not reject brain-transplant thought experiments, only those that use another mechanism like 
a brain-state transfer device to get the psychology from one body to another. 
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people who cannot understand what they are being asked to imagine3). To show it false, we 
only need an instance where we apply our concepts in ways that the theories say we cannot. 
As long as no deep impossibilities are being hidden by a thin description, then no elaborate 
detail is needed to achieve this end. 
 
Is the first mistake really a mistake? 
Wagner denies that either of these is actually a methodological mistake. As to the first one, 
he contends that we do indeed need to know all of the social details that Wilkes demands if 
we are to get to what we think about persons and their identity. What I have got wrong is to 
assume that the concept of person exists in a vacuum and to take this “to assume that 
personhood would not be a different concept if it were shaped by vastly unlike 
circumstances” (21).I have adopted a view that there are certain intrinsic person-constitutive 
features that hold across all possible worlds, ignoring the importance of the relational and 
social nature of persons and how personhood is embedded in particular social practices. 
That I ultimately draw the conclusion that personal identity is a matter of intrinsic 
(psychological) features means that I am actually begging the question (22). 
The details Wilkes demands, he suggests, are all-important: 
If the social ontology of personhood was vastly different in a possible world, then 
there is little to gain for an investigation of “our” concept of a person. And so, 
universities and marriages and all the other socially constructed observer-dependent 
facts…work in a specific way precisely because they are so closely tied to our social 
ontological concept of personhood. We cannot treat these observer-dependent facts 
as though they were observer independent, facts holding across all possible worlds. 
Marriages and universities in a world in which splitting is commonplace would 
potentially be unlike ours in a great many different ways because the underlying 
concept of a person would be significantly different. Perhaps in such a world your 
split sister was also married to your husband and your split brother was also allowed 
to take your upcoming metaphysics midterm because you were seen as one and the 
same person. The reason, then, for why we need to hear more about the practices 
that people in such a possible world would have is not to know what ‘they’ would 
think, but because we cannot figure out what ‘we’ think without information about the 
social functionality of the transformed beings (Wagner 2016, 21-22). 
 
One aspect of this response is immediately puzzling. This is the charge that I assume 
that the concept person exists in a vacuum and is the same across all possible worlds. It is 
puzzling since that is something I explicitly deny. My claim that it is a mistake to confuse us 
with them rests on the suggestion that their concept might be different from ours, given the 
different circumstances with which they have to cope. Especially in circumstances radically 
different from ours, beliefs and practices which relate to how a concept is applied are very 
likely to be different. And I acknowledged that we have no adequate way of working out how 
                                           
3
 Just enough detail until they get it. 
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those practices will change, and so are in no position to speak with any authority4 about 
what their concept would be after radical change. But my point was that their concept is not 
what thought experiments are meant to investigate. Thought experiments are after our 
concept and its commitments. And we do not need to have special insight into what people 
in another world would think to find out what we think. To have it spelt out for us what they in 
the scenario think might make it easier for us to apply our concept—as I discussed in 
detail—but it is not a requirement for getting to our conceptual commitments. 
Even if we did need to know what they would think, Wagner’s contentions do not affect a 
central strand of my case that there is a mistake going on here. This is that Wilkes (and 
Wagner and, to a lesser extent, Schechtman) base their misgivings on our inability to predict 
how our concept would be affected by radically different circumstances. The problematic 
thought experiments at which they gesture involve individuals who split all the time—
universities that double in size every few days, spontaneous unpredictable splitting, or your 
split sister being also married to your split husband. These are all very complex (though not 
really all that difficult to understand, and ones that may not really lead to different notions of 
personhood). But that complexity is simply beside the point. A thought experiment of the kind 
in question tries to isolate specific conditions—in our case whether being the same person 
requires being the same organism. That needs a case in which we agree that this is the 
same person, but it is not the same organism. The splitting need not be spontaneous, or 
multiple, or involve any change to social institutions or be unpredictable in any way—the 
thought experiment can specify (or describe in detail for the troubled) simple “social 
functionality”. Because of that, the practical difficulties grounded in complexity that all of 
these critics raise are simply not relevant. Schechtman takes the same line as Wagner, 
however: 
If we encountered a single instance of doubling we undoubtedly would not know how 
to react, and if it became common we would become different sorts of beings with an 
entirely different (and to me not-yet-imaginable) social organization and another way 
of life…Such beings might come to be, but they will probably not be persons 
(Schechtman 2014, 164). 
 
But this is hyperbole, and an illustration of my complaint. We can understand a single case 
perfectly well—we react to (the story of) a transplant quite equably. That we might actually 
be troubled if it were to happen does not reflect on what we think now about such a case. 
There is no reason to have to imagine a wildly complicated world in which the phenomenon 
occurs, just as there is no reason why we have to think about splitting being common. And 
the leap to splitters probably not being persons is simply out of order. The reasons being 
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 That is, we do not know how people will actually behave should circumstances change radically. But 
that does not mean we cannot stipulate what they think for the purposes of a thought experiment 
scenario. We do have authority in that sense, and that is enough for getting at what we think now. 
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suggested here for not taking the relevant thought experiments seriously are not close to 
being adequate to the task. 
 
 
Is the second mistake really a mistake? 
Wagner also takes issue with what I called the mistake of seeing thought experiments as 
confirmers. Their role as I outlined it is to undermine strong claims made by particular 
theories. He suggests I present no positive argument for this view, that it is a highly 
idiosyncratic one, and that it can even be seen as self-defeating. 
Let me begin with the charge of idiosyncrasy. According to Wagner, this is because my 
view of thought experiments as refuters would only apply if theories of personal identity were 
making claims of necessity. This, he suggests is not the case—not all of them are committed 
to necessity claims (Wagner 2016, 23). I only erroneously think they do because of my 
assumption that only intrinsic features matter to personal identity. I have denied that I make 
that assumption.5 That aside, the theories that I suggested in my paper were affected by the 
thought experiments under discussion—those of Williams, Olson and Schechtman—all do 
make necessity claims. Williams thinks that continuity of body is necessary for identity; 
Olson thinks the same of being a continuing human organism. Schechtman’s theory has a 
very different feel to it, but even she is offering, in her Person Life View (PLV), a theory that 
she stresses is a metaphysical one and which makes claims very like necessity claims. The 
PLV is the view that to be the same person is to continue to live the same person life. 
Person life is a cluster concept, comprising psychological, biological and social continuities 
which usually function together and no one of which is itself necessary for survival if the 
other two are in place. But that does not mean she is not making necessity claims—two of 
them must be in place. In fact she actually does require one of them in all cases (and 
perhaps in all worlds). She writes, 
it is essential to the judgment that a person survives a “whole-body transplant” that 
the transplant product is able to pick up the thread of the life of the person who 
enters surgery. This can happen only if the transplant product is accorded the 
appropriate place in person-space; that is, if she is treated as…the continuation of 
the original locus of concern (Schechtman 2014, 152, my italics). 
 
Her view on how thought experiments work is different from mine, as I described in the 
original paper, but this does not mean she is avoiding claims of necessity. In her view,  
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 Although it is very widely held to be a fundamental principle that identity must be intrinsic—cf. 
Noonan (1989, 152 and 164), Williams (1960, 45—at least according to Parfit 1984, 267), and early 
Schechtman (1996, 31). 
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once the case stipulates that the person who results from the transfer is treated as 
and responds as the original person the implication that the cerebrum donor survives 
as the whole body recipient follows immediately (Schechtman 2014, 153). 
If that implication follows immediately, then we are dealing with something very like a claim 
of necessity—like enough to necessity to make my account relevant.  
What might be unusual about my theory is that others think that thought experiments are 
in the business of establishing necessity claims. Jonathan Ichikawa and Benjamin Jarvis 
write, “On our view, intuitions [in response to thought experiments] are judgments of 
necessity, and we see no in principle objection to the idea that we can know them a priori” 
(Ichikawa and Jarvis 2009, 223). George Bealer thinks that they “present themselves as 
necessary” (Bealer 1998, 207). But a single case can never establish necessity. That does 
not need any argument. And it does not seem to me that the claim that thought experiments 
do not offer significant positive confirmation of a theory needs much more. A single 
experiment at most offers a little confirmation of a theory in other fields. It also confirms 
every other theory consistent with the experimental result. A story offers less confirmation 
than that, and also confirms to the same degree every other theory consistent with the story. 
Thought experiments only become interesting to the argument once they threaten a theory, 
and that is exactly my point that they function as refuters.6 
Wagner sees my view as a denial of any positive role for thought experiments, despite 
my insistence that that they offer indirect support for a theory by undermining rivals. All 
theories of identity, he says, have faced fanciful cases that have indicated problems in them. 
“This, however, has been done in order to support a rival view by showing that this view 
does not suffer from problems in the scenario” (Wagner 2016, 23). That is exactly my view 
on what they can do: it goes without saying that for it to offer indirect support for your theory, 
your theory must be consistent with the thought experiment. To propose a thought 
experiment which destroyed your own theory in your efforts to counter your opponent would 
be a most rash strategy indeed.  
Wagner suggests my view of thought experiments being primarily refuters makes them 
pointless: “I am unaware of any theory that has not been haunted by dubious counter 
examples” (23). But this argument turns on the thought experiments involved being dubious 
ones, and that all problems are of equal weight. That will not work as a reply here—the 
thought experiments on which I focused are the critics’ own ones, raising problems that they 
acknowledge need solving.7 
                                           
6
 I am not the only person to hold this view. Roy Sorenson calls them “alethic refuters” (1992, 135). 
7
 Olson goes to great lengths to reject the force of the transplant on the grounds that reasoning from it 
to the falsity of his view requires reliance on an inference from moral responsibility to identity that 
holders of the PCT cannot make because of their commitment to fission arguments (1997, Ch 3); to 
no avail, as I argue in Beck (2004).  
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The charge of my method being self-defeating is as follows. A thought experiment can 
count against a theory and indirectly in support of another only if the second theory is better 
able to deal with the scenario. “But then the thought experiment serves to confirm the theory, 
and Beck does not want to have it that way” (Wagner 2016, 23). But that is exactly how Beck 
does want to have it and how he has set the method out—it is just that that confirmation 
does not offer much positive support, unless the confirmed theory were the only one that 
could possibly deal with the scenario. That might be the case in some instance, but would 
need much further argument8 and remains in line with my account of the method as turning 
on refutation. Thought experiments only become interesting once they reveal a problem. 
Wagner ends his case here by reading me as implying that transplant cases support the 
PCT by counting against all theories other than the PCT (23).But that bears no relation to 
any argument of mine. I only suggested that such cases count against two theories, and I 
think that there are many considerations other than these cases that count in favour of the 
PCT. 
 
The implausibility and impossibility of my transplant 
I detected both of my “mistakes” occurring in Schechtman’s use of a transplant thought 
experiment, and then presented a development of her transplant case that I argued counted 
against her Person Life View (while the PCT could cope happily with it). Hers is a detailed 
story: 
Sometime in the future an environmental toxin reaches levels at which it begins to 
regularly cause liver failure in a large segment of the population. A technique is 
developed to clone healthy livers from an individual’s own tissue, transplant 
techniques are improved, and liver transplants become common. Later the toxin 
begins to attack other organs, and these are regularly cloned and transplanted as 
well. Eventually, it attacks all tissue but the cerebrum (which is somehow protected). 
Fortunately, cloning technology has developed to the point where healthy whole 
organisms can regularly be cloned. Moreover, the development of clones can be 
accelerated and directed so that the result is an adult human body that looks almost 
exactly like the individual from whom the genetic material was taken, but which lacks 
a cerebrum. The cerebrum of the diseased individual is then placed into the 
cerebrum-less skull of the cloned human, carrying with it the individual’s beliefs, 
values, desires, memories and so on. This operation inevitably and immediately 
leads to the end of the biological life of the organism that used to contain the 
cerebrum. Everyone refers to this operation as a “full body transplant” and sees it as 
the limiting case of the transplantation of individual organs. Just as it is assumed that 
a person survives when she gets a new liver or kidney or heart, it is assumed that a 
person survives when she gets a new body (or, strictly speaking, cerebrum-
complement). After post-surgical recovery the patient typically returns to her family, 
friends, job and hobbies (Schechtman 2014, 151–152). 
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 Just as Locke has to go on to argue that his prince and cobbler case does not provide equal 
confirmation to identity being a matter of continued immaterial substance as to his own theory. He 
needs further thought experiments to achieve this. 
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Her PLV yields the judgement that, since the recipient of the cerebrum has both 
psychological and social continuities, they continue the person life and so survive, despite 
the lack of biological continuity. She acknowledges that there may be a problem for her view 
concerning the donor organism which continues to exist, since it is in an analogous situation 
to a patient with advanced dementia—who the PLV would also count as continuing the 
person life and so surviving. She has a response to this, as I described. But I put forward a 
different possible development which I thought was more difficult to cope with. 
Consider a society in which a cerebrum transplant operation occurs. The cerebrum of 
a person, with their fully developed psychology is transplanted into another body, 
leaving her original body as a living organism with whatever support it requires to 
function in a minimal way as before. This society sees this organism as the original 
person and treats her accordingly, just as they treat someone who has lost her 
capacities and is in very advanced dementia. They ignore the troublesome individual 
who keeps turning up at the hospital entreating them to take notice of her. They are 
firm in the belief that that they are acting correctly and eventually resort to a 
restraining order against this annoyance. According to the PLV there is no problem, 
since there is only one individual who takes up the original person life and who is the 
subject of the required social continuity and has one of the other two continuities, the 
biological one. But, of course, there is a problem (Beck 2014, 198). 
 
In line with my account of thought experiments, I contended that the onus would be on the 
critic to show that the development I had introduced to Schechtman’s thought experiment 
concealed some deep problem, or otherwise the PLV’s counterintuitive verdict would count 
against the theory. Wagner takes up the challenge: “The seeming force against the ‘Person 
Life View’ stems from a conceptual implausibility and an empirical impossibility” (25). 
Before looking at what Wagner believes these deep problems are, a point I made at the 
outset should be revisited. This was that the thought experiments that formed the focus of 
my paper were not my ones, but ones outlined by those critical of the theory I favour and 
aspects of its methods. Rather than take on the particular development of a transplant case 
that I have outlined, Wagner argues against the assumptions of transplant thought 
experiments in general. That is perfectly acceptable as a philosophical move outside of this 
dialectical context, but hardly fair as a response to my particular paper. When he sets out the 
“false assumptions” that I make he is taking on assumptions that those to whom I was 
responding had granted me by making them themselves. They amount to common cause. In 
the context of the argument, what is required is isolation of impossibilities only I and not the 
other users of transplant thought experiments have assumed. Nothing meeting that 
description is ultimately to be found in his response. 
That being said, I do not agree that any of us are guilty of the charges laid, or that our 
scenario is as confused as Wagner would have it. 
The first mistaken assumption of my transplant that he identifies is that I grant the 
cerebrum traditional features of the soul. “What is presupposed…is a conception of the 
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psychological subject as a discrete and unified object located within the brain and as such 
(at least in principle) removable from the rest of the body” (Wagner 2016, 25). What this 
presupposition ignores is how cognition depends on far more of the body than just the brain, 
even though the brain is pivotal in maintaining your psychology. He outlines how 
Schechtman in an earlier paper (1997) pointed to a “Distributed View” where the brain is 
seen in cognition as the heart is seen in circulation—as the central organ at the core of a 
system distributed throughout the entire organism. There is thus no clear-cut distinction to be 
made between the brain and body as the transplant requires (25). 
Empirical evidence backs up how important bodily features are to how we navigate the 
world and how they impact our distinctive psychology. Our immune systems distinguish 
between our and other tissue, and rejection has been observed in brain tissue transplants. 
This means we cannot expect psychology to be transplanted with a cerebrum. What I have 
done wrong is to submit to a wishful “impulse to impose conceptions of the mind formed 
within the context of dualism onto a materialist ontology” (Wagner 2016, 25). 
In dismissing this latter impulse, Wagner appears to have forgotten his own views about 
the importance of the social ontology in which the conceptual genesis of personhood takes 
place. The genesis of our concept of personhood is very much in a context where dualism is 
a possibility. To rule out, as conceptually impossible, disembodied minds is to choose to 
investigate a notion of mind and personhood that is by no means a common one. Nor is that 
common understanding of mind obviously at odds with a materialist ontology: the task of the 
materialist is to locate the concept of mind with all of its quirks—or as many of them as can 
be consistently retained—in a physical world. It is worth noting that arch-materialist David 
Armstrong sets as a requirement on any theory of mind that it allows the possibility of 
disembodied existence—precisely because that is part of the concept that he is trying to 
locate in the material world (Armstrong 1993, 19–20). Not all of that inheritance may be 
redeemable: there are aspects we may have to give up as having no place in reality or as 
conceptually mistaken—just as the PCT gives up the principle that identity is always what 
matters. 
The empirical evidence that Wagner points to is important, but none of it marks the 
transplant scenario as impossible. Our cognition relies (in actuality) on all sorts of 
relationships between brain and body. As he says, our distinctive psychologies and way of 
making our way through the world are shaped by the bodies we have and the interaction 
between brain and the rest of the body. But, although Wagner is suggesting that my 
psychology is the result of the particular body I have, the evidence presented requires no 
more than a particular type of body—one that is very like mine. To think like I do, I need the 
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central organ9 that governs my thought—my cerebrum—and a body that has the same sort 
of relation to my brain as mine does. But that is what transplant thought experiments 
presume: Williams made and resolved all of these points back in “The Self and the Future”, 
and thought experiments nowadays use twins and exactly similar bodies of new matter as 
run-of-the-mill features. Schechtman’s version uses a cloned body. Such a body rules out 
the tissue rejection objection as beside the point (and it was never a conceptual 
impossibility, as Wagner acknowledges (26). 
Is it not important that “Beck and Schechtman do not share the same presuppositions 
when it comes to the cerebrum transplant thought experiment that Beck takes to cause 
trouble for the ‘Person Life View’” (Wagner 2016, 26)? It is not important, because it is not 
true. The Schechtman who rejects the transplant is the Schechtman of 1997, who 
(interestingly) accepts the assumption attributed by Wagner to me that personal identity 
must be a matter of intrinsic features (a point she suggested then that the PCT cannot 
include) (cf. Schechtman 1996, 31). The Schechtman to whom I am responding is that of 
2014 who explicitly shares my presuppositions about the transplant scenario—it is her 
scenario after all, one she uses to argue for (among other things) the superiority of her PLV 
over animalism. The PLV suggests that you do survive the transplant, as we have seen—as 
long as the survivor takes up your place in person-space. Schechtman and I share a view on 
“the closely intertwined relation between brain and body” where Wagner sees a contrast 
(25)—she does not (despite his contention) see a relation between brain and a particular 
body as “crucial in preserving identity” (Wagner 2016, 25). 2014 Schechtman differs with me 
on how many teeth thought experiments have, but not on the presuppositions or even the 
outcome of the transplant. As a result, I cannot see any actual grounds for Wagner’s claim 
that her PLV has an advantage over the PCT. Rather, relying only on her presuppositions, a 
different version of the transplant like that I set out in my paper can be described, in 
response to which the PLV yields a strongly counterintuitive judgment. Unlike the PCT. 
There is one point that Wagner raises that is specific to my version of the transplant. For 
argument’s sake, he grants that a cerebrum transplant might be successful as envisaged 
and be accompanied by the social circumstances I specified, then goes on to argue that the 
thought experiment would not be useful to my case. 
But even if it did happen, one could argue that it is not obvious that those people 
would be wrong in claiming that the original person would be the donor and not the 
recipient. What we would have discovered is not that that is how people in this other 
world think of things, but rather that is how “we” think of things. Take an example: 
you might say, “If I win the lottery I would quit my job in an instant” and then find out, 
when you do win the lottery that you actually do not want to quit. Similarly we might 
want to say that the recipient of the cerebrum would surely be the same person, but if 
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the experiment were performed it might turn out that we actually feel differently 
(Wagner 2016, 26). 
 
However, we do not discover what we think in this way—we discover rather what people 
would think if it were to happen. I am not disputing that changing circumstances can change 
judgements. But that means that we discover what they think, or how thinking would change 
if circumstances were to change. That is exactly my point about distinguishing between us 
and them. We are after our concept—represented in how we think we would behave (“what 
we want to say” in Wagner’s terms) and not after theirs—which might be revealed in how 
those in the circumstances actually behave.10 We may well not be able to predict with any 
accuracy how we would behave if circumstances changed drastically. Our intuitions have 
only representational authority—they reveal at best what we think; they are not direct routes 
to reality and do not have that sort of epistemic authority.11 But it is only representational 
authority on which thought experiments rely, and all that they need to be effective refuters of 
a theory of personal identity, and indirect supporters of another. 
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